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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ALAN GOLUB and MARILYN GOLUB, Supreme Court No. 41505-2013 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs /Respondents, 
v. 
KIRK-SCOTT, LTD., a Texas corporation; 
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company; 
GERALDINE KIRK-HUGHES and PETER SAMPSON, 
husband and wife; KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and 
KELLY POLATIS, an individual, 
and DELANO D. and LENORE J. PETERSON, husband and wife, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - KIRK SCOTT, LTD. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County, Honorable 
Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge, Presiding. 
Matthew Crotty, Residing at Spokane, Washington, Attorney for Appellant Kirk-Scott, Ltd. 
Michael Bissell, Residing at Spokane, Washington, Attorneys for Appellants, Kirk-Hughes 
Development, LLC; Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, Peter Sampson, and, Kirk-Hughes & Associates, 
Inc. 
Michael Howard, Residing at Coeur d' Alene, Idaho, Attorneys for Respondents, Golub 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alan and Marilyn Golub (Golub) cite Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 
535, 650 P.2d 677 (1982) for the proposition that a trial court abuses its discretion when it 
arbitrarily disregards "relevant facts" on a motion to vacate. (Resp. Br. p. 7) Some of the 
"relevant facts" before the trial court on Kirk-Scott, Ltd.'s (Kirk-Scott) motion to vacate were: (a) 
Alan Golub's deposition testimony that Golub was entitled to, at most, $464,617.50 of the 
$941,000 default judgment at issue in this case; (b) that Golub has recovered twice on the default 
judgment; and, (c) that Golub's affidavit of amount due, upon which the 2009 default judgment is 
based, related to only one defendant (Kelly Politas) but the trial court awarded default relief 
against four other defendants (Peter Sampson, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, Kirk-Hughes & 
Associates, Inc., and Geraldine Kirk-Hughes) for which Golub did not file an affidavit of amount 
due in support of the default against the four other defendants. (R, Vol. 1. p. 170-174) Tellingly, 
Golub's appeal response brief does not even address point (c). 
The trial court ignored points (a), (b), and (c) on Kirk-Scott's motion to vacate. The trial 
court did not address, at all, Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) motions in any of its \vritten 
or oral decisions. When Kirk-Scott moved the trial court to reconsider points (a), (b) and the 
trial court's non-consideration of the Rule 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) motions, the trial court sua sponte 
sanctioned Kirk-Scott. The trial court's disregard of those facts, and subsequent sanctioning of 
Kirk-Scott, are precisely the "unjust and compelling circumstances which justifY such relief' 
under Rule 60 and the trial court should be reversed for not granting Kirk-Scott that relief and 
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then sanctioning Kirk-Scott when Kirk-Scott raised those points on reconsideration. (Resp. Br. p. 
8 citing Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. 153 Idaho 440, 449-50, 283 P.3d 
757 (2012)) 
The trial court also elTed in granting Golub summary judgment on Golub's declaratory 
judgment action by: (a) not requiring Golub to establish the "good faith" element of his Ie 55-
606 claim; and, (b) allowing Golub to foreclose with a judgment not supported by valuable 
consideration. The trial court's summary judgment ruling should be reversed 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Golub's opening response to Kirk-Scott, Ltd.s' (Kirk-Scott) appeal argues the "relevant 
and undisputed facts" are "Golub is a judgment creditor on a $941,000 judgment." CRespo Br. p. 
3) While the default judgment awarded Golub $941,000, the record before the trial court showed 
that Golub was entitled to far less. The record contained Alan Golub's 2007 under oath 
deposition testimony which made clear that Golub was entitled to, at most, $464,617.50 of the 
$941,000. Kirk-Scott, a stranger to the action in which Golub obtained the $941,000 default 
judgment, repeatedly infOlmed the trial court of that undisputed fact. The trial court ignored that 
fact (nowhere is it mentioned in any of the trial court's orders in this case) on Kirk-Scott's motion 
to vacate and then sanctioned Kirk-Scott when Kirk-Scott re-addressed that point on 
reconsideration. 
While Idaho law allows trial courts discretion to vacate default judgments (and award 
sanctions), that discretion is not without limitation. The trial court in this case exceeded those 
limits by allowing Alan Golub to enforce his $941,000 default judgment against Kirk-Scott when 
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the record established that, inter alia, (a) Golub was, at best, personally entitled to $464,617.50 
of the $941,000 he obtained via default, (b) Golub recovered twice on the default judgment; (c) 
the default judgment awarded Golub more than what Golub prayed for in the underlying 
complaint, and (d) the trial court abused its discretion in not even addressing Kirk-Scott's rule 
60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) motions. Points (a), (b), (c), and (d) taken alone mandate vacation of the 
default judgment and the trial court abused discretion in not doing so. Points (a), (b), (c), and (d) 
taken together, underscore the trial court's arbitrary disregard of the facts, Idaho law and Kirk-
Scott's rights under the law. The trial court also abused its discretion by (i) requiring Kirk-Scott 
to establish "when" it became aware of the default judgment and (ii) sanctioning Kirk -Scott after 
Kirk-Scott sought, based on Golub's own undisputed testimony, to get that judgment reduced 
following summary judgment. The trial court arbitrarily disregarded the above-referenced facts 
(and more) and relevant legal principles and should be reversed as to denying Kirk-Scott's 
motion to vacate and sua sponte sanctioning Kirk-Scott. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in Golub's favor also warrants reversal. 
Idaho law requires an encumbrancer, i.e. "[0 ]ne having a legal claim, such as a lien ... against 
property", l to establish "good faith" in order to deieat Idaho's "conclusiveness of conveyance" 
statute, I.C. § 55-606. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Golub on Golub's 
2013 declaratory judgment action by improperly excusing Golub from establishing the IC 55-606 
"good faith" element and ignoring the record evidence of: (a) Golub's knowledge of Kirk-Scott's 
"clear title" to the subject property; and, (b) the default judgment not being supported by 
I Black's Law Dictionary, at 432 (7th Ed. 2000). 
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valuable consideration. 
For the reasons stated below the trial court should be reversed and this case should be 
remanded to a different trial judge for a jury trial. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Kirk-Scott's Motion to Vacate the 
default judgment. 
"Determining whether to set aside a default judgment requires an appellate court to 'apply 
a standard of liberality rather than strictness and give the party moving to vacate the default the 
benefit of a genuine doubt.'" Kovachy v. DeLeusomme, 122 Idaho 973, 974, 842 P.2d 309, 310 
(et. App. 1992). Analyzing whether a trial court abused its discretion requires assessing: (a) 
whether the trial court made findings of fact that were not clearly erroneous; (b) whether the trial 
court applied the proper Rule 60 criteria (with an eye toward favoring relief in doubtful cases); 
and, (c) the trial court's decision logically applied the Rule 60 criteria to the facts. Allis Credit 
COlp. v. Smith, 117 Idaho 118, 120 (Ct.App.1990). Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 373, 283 
P.3d 118, 120 (Ct. App. 2012). Keane is illustrative ofIdaho's "policy favoring relief in doubtful 
cases and resolution on the merits" as it involved the trial court granting default relief for the 
same defendant not once, but twice, in the same case. Id The defendant in Keane was a party to 
the litigation in which both defaults occurred and were then vacated under Rule 60. Yet the trial 
court ignored Keane and denied Kirk-Scott's motion to vacate even though Kirk-Scott was a 
stranger to the litigation in which Golub obtained the default judgment. See infra. §B. 
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Here the trial court abused its discretion by, inter alia, (1) not considering Golub's own 
testimony which established that Golub was entitled to, at best, $464,617.50 of the $941,000.00 
default judgment; (2) not considering the undisputed fact that (i) Golub supported his default 
motion with an affidavit that sought relief against one (Kelly Polatis) of the seven defendants in 
the case (Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, Kirk-Hughes & Associates, Inc., Geraldine Kirk-
Hughes, Peter Sampson, Lenore Peterson, and Delano Peterson) but (ii) was awarded a default 
judgment against Kelly Polatis and Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, Kirk-Hughes & 
Associates, Inc., Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, Peter Sampson - - - an event that mandates vacation of 
the default judgment as IRCP 55 does not allow a party to move for default against one 
defendant (Politas) but obtain a default judgment against four other defendants against whom no 
affidavit of amount due was filed; and, (3) ignoring that Golub's 2007 complaint, at best, sought 
$941,000 against Delano and Lenore Peterson and no one else. 
For those reasons and the reasons set out below, the default judgment should be vacated. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion by requiring: Kirk-Scott (a non-party to the 
action in which the default judgment was obtained) to establish when it became 
aware of the default judg:ment. 
The trial court erred in requiring Kirk-Scott to show that its Rule 60 motion was timely. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 416) Under the facts of this case Kirk-Scott (a) did not need to make such a 
showing but (b) made the timeliness showing nonetheless. 
Regarding point (a), there is no known Idaho case that addresses whether a non-party to 
the action in which a default judgment was obtained has, for purposes of attacking the default 
judgment at a later date, to establish "when" it became aware of the default judgment. Indeed, 
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none of the cases cited by Golub or the trial court address A [Golub] suing B [Kirk-Hughes], A 
getting a default judgment against B, and A years later suing C [Kirk-Scott] for the purposes of 
establishing priority of the default judgment obtained against B in the A vs. B case. 
Golub argues that the trial court properly exercised discretion in considering Kirk-Scott's 
relationship with Kirk-Hughes and cites Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 
234 PJd 699, 704 (2010), in support. (Resp. Br. p. 13) Golub's argument fails for three reasons, 
First, Dawson supports Kirk-Scott's argument that the trial court abused discretion by not ruling 
on Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b)(5) and Rule 60(b)(6) motions. (Kirk-Scott Appeal Br. pg. 25-26) 
Specifically, Dawson held H[t]he district court erred by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson's Rule 
60(b)(6) motion." Id. at 380, 381. Here the trial court erred in not addressing Kirk-Scott's Rule 
60(b)(5) and Rule 60(b)(6) motions. (Kirk-Scott Appeal Br. pg. 25-26) Second, Golub's 
argument that the trial court properly considered the Kirk-Hughes/Kirk-Scott relationship is 
equally misplaced. Neither Golub or the trial court identified any authority that mandates a 
corporation's member (here Kirk-Scott as a member of Kirk-Hughes) to establish when it became 
aware of the default judgment for the purposes of a motion to vacate. Moreover, neither the trial 
court or Golub identified any authority requiring a corporation's member to then take legal action 
in the member's name when the parent company (here Kirk-Hughes Development) receives a 
default judgment. For it is illogical to require members, shareholders, individual owners to take 
action in their individual capacity when the corporate entity with whom they have an 
ownership/membership interest is subject to a judgment. By allowing that illogical result the trial 
court abused its discretion. Third, Golub's citation to Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada Cnty., 
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104 Idaho 727, 729-30, 662 P.2d 1171, 1173-74 (CL App. 1983), is distinguishable. Johnson 
involved A suing B (and serving an employee of B with the summons and complaint), and then 
B changing its name to C (who continued to employ the same employee who received the 
summons and complaint) - - - not the case here. The default judgment in Johnson was vacated -
- - not the case here. 
Regarding point (b), Kirk-Scott (a stranger to the action where the default judgment was 
obtained) established timeliness. Kirk-Scott moved to vacate the default judgment within three 
(3) months and 11 days of answering Golub's 2013 Complaint while also (a) moving to dismiss 
Golub's case, (b) propounding discovery on Golub, (c) analyzing that discovery, (d) deposing 
Golub, (e) analyzing the CV07-8038 (2007 Action) filings (to which Kirk-Scott was not a party), 
(f) responding to Golub's motion for summary judgment, and (g) moving to vacate Golub's 
March 11, 2009, default judgment. (Kirk-Scott Br. at p. 15~28) Further, neither Kirk-Scott or its 
president, Balinda Antoine, knew of the default judgment before being served with Golub's 
declaratory judgment action. Id at ~27. (R, Vol. 1, p. 464-466) Kirk-Scott made its motion to 
vacate within LR.C.P. 60(b)'s "reasonable time" standard, informed the trial court of the same, 
but the trial court disregarded Kirk-Scott's showing and then sanctioned Kirk-Scott after Kirk-
Scott supplied, on reconsideration, the affidavit of Balinda Antoine for the purpose of rebutting 
the trial court's July 9, 2013, ruling that allowed Golub to file evidence in response to Kirk-
Scott's Motion to Vacate the day of the hearing. (Kirk-Scott Appeal Br. pg. 40) Golub's reliance 
on Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 71, 995 P.2d 835, 841 (Ct. App. 2000) is easily 
distinguishable as the party seeking vacation of default in Viafax "offered no explanation for its 
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delay of nearly five months in seeking Rule 60(b) relief". Here Kirk -Scott's aggressive defense 
of Golub's 2013 Action is ample reason and explanation for it waiting three months to bring its 
motion. See supra. Golub's citation to Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 359, 360, 806 P.2d 452, 453 
(Ct. App. 1991) and lvfcGrew v. JifcGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 554, 82 P.3d 833, 836 (2003), are 
misplaced because both involve defaults taken during divorce proceedings (i.e. A vs. B cases) 
and do not involve the fact pattern at issue in this case (A vs. B and then A suing C years later 
and using the default judgment as basis for the lawsuit). 
C. The trial court abused discretion by not addressing Kirk-Scott's IRCP 60(b)(5) 
and Rule 60(b)(6) motions, ignoring Golub's disregard for IRCP 55, and in not 
vacating the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) because the default judQIDent 
awarded more than what was prayed for in the complaint. 
1. Dawson requires reversal of the trial-court's non-addressing of Kirk-Scott's Rule 
60(b)(5) and (b) (6) motions. 
Kirk-Scott moved to vacate the default judgment under IRCP 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5), and 
60(b)(6). (Kirk-Scott Br. p. 25-26) The trial cOUli did not address Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b)(5) and 
Rule 60(b)(6) motions. Id. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust mandates reversal when, as is the 
case here, the trial court does not address a party's Rule 60(b)( 5) and Rule 60(b)( 6) motions. 
Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380 - 381. Accordingly, the trial court should be reversed for failure to 
exercise discretion by not ruling, at all, on Kirk -Scott's Rule 60(b)( 5) and Rule 60(b)( 6) motions. 
2. Golub's failure to comply with IRCP 55 requires reversal under Rule 60(b)(6). 
In addition to violating Dawson, trial court erred in denying Kirk-Scott's motion to vacate 
because the default judgment was incompliant with IRCP 55(b). By way of a recap, on June 11, 
2008, Mr. Golub filed the "Affidavit of Alan Golub in Support of Motion for Default Judgment 
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Against Kelly Polatis. If (R, Vol. 1, at p. 170) Exhibit 1 to Mr. Golub's June 11, 2008, Affidavit 
is the "listing agreement" to which Mr. Golub claims he is entitled to $941,000.00. Id at p. 171. 
On February 26,2009, Golub's counsel moved, under LR.C.P. 55(b)(1) for a Motion for Default 
Judgment. Id at p. 190 192. The memorandum in support of the default motion was supported 
by a February 18, 2009, affidavit of Golub's counsel and the June 1 02 [sic], 2008, Affidavit that 
Alan J. Golub filed against Kelly Polatis - - - just one of the seven defendants in the 2007 Action. 
Id at p. 170-174, p. 190-192. The February 26,2009, motion for default against Kirk-Hughes 
Development, LLC (and others) was not supported by "an affidavit of the amount due showing 
the method of computation, together with any original instrument evidencing the claim" against 
defendant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (or any other defendant besides Polatis) as required 
by IRCP 55(b)(1) - - - it was supported by an Affidavit of amount due against Kelly Polatis and 
Kelly Polatis only. Id IRCP 55(b)(1) makes clear that an affidavit ofanlount due as it relates to a 
default must set out the amount due as to each party: 
When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum 
which can by computation be made certain, the court or the clerk thereof, upon 
request of the plaintiff, and upon the filing of an affidavit of the amount due 
showing the method of computation, together with any original instrument 
evidencing the claim unless otherwise permitted by the court, shall enter judgment 
for that amount and costs against the defendant. LR.C.P. 55(b)(1)(emphasis 
added). 
Here the trial court erred allowed Golub to submit an affidavit for a sum certain against 
one defendant (Politas) but then erred by entering default against multiple defendants based on 
2 The reference to the June 10, 2008, Golub Affidavit was a typographical error. The docket 
contains no evidence of a June 10, 2008 Golub Affidavit but does contain evidence of a June 11, 
2008 Golub Affidavit. (R, Voll. pg. 211-224) 
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the Golub June 2008 affidavit that sought amount due against Politas. What Golub did was akin 
to (a) John Doe suing Microsoft:, Amazon, and Google, (b) John Doe moving for default against 
Microsoft, (c) John Doe filing an affidavit of amount due setting out his monetary damage 
against Microsoft: but (d) John Doe then asking the trial court to enter default judgment against 
Microsoft and Amazon and Google and the trial court granting Mr. Doe's request. The trial court 
allowed this to happen here even though IRCP 55(b)(1) does not allow for such a result. Golub 
does not address this issue on appeal. (Kirk-Scott Br. at 26-27) 
3. The trial court erred in denying Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by denying Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. 
The "default judgment provisions of Rule 54( c) embody "the essentials of due process and of fair 
play." Johnson v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 99 Idaho 134, 138,578 P.2d 676, 680 (1978). Rule 54(c) 
states, in part: 
(c) Demand for Judgment. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind 
from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
The phrase "demand for judgment" means the complaint's prayer for relief. See id. at 137. 
Johnson, which Golub cites, involved: (i) the complaint's body seeking defendant's "community 
property," including defendant's "various policies of insurance;" (ii) the complaint not 
mentioning the "insurance policies" in its prayer for relief (but mentioning other community 
property items in the prayer for relief); and, (iii) the plaintiff obtaining "insurance polici,es" (and 
the community property prayed for in the prayer for relief) via a default judgment. Johnson, 99 
Idaho at 137. Johnson held that "under the narrow circumstances of this case" the default 
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judgment complied with Rule 54(c). ld. at 139. Such narrow circumstances do not exist in this 
case. 
Golub's 2007 Complaint did not "fairly appraise" Kirk-Hughes of "the type and amount 
of damages claimed." (Resp. Br. pg. 15) The 2007 Complaint mentioned $941,000 in one 
sentence and did not pray, in its demand for judgment, that $941,000 to be awarded to any party. 
(Resp. Br. at 16) That omission makes sense given Golub's September 2007 testimony that he, at 
most, was entitled to only $464,000 of the $941,000. 
Golub's response to Kirk-Scott's double recovery argument also undercuts Golub's "fair 
reading" argument. Golub argues that IRCP 60(b)( 4) is inapplicable because a "fair" reading of 
the 2007 Complaint informed all defendants that Golub sought $941,000.00 against everyone; 
but, in response to Kirk-Scott's double recovery argument, argues that "this is [not] a contract 
case in which the damage for breach is a specified amount which may not be recovered twice." 
(Resp. Br. pg. 37) What Golub says on page 37 of his appeal response briefis VvTong: page 5 of 
the 2007 Complaint (i) states "FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT",3 
and, (ii) alleges "Peterson breached their contractual obligations when they failed to pay Golub a 
commission." (R, Vol. 1, p. 166, L. 17-25) Golub cannot properly argue (on pages 15 -16 of his 
brief) that his 2007 Complaint fairly apprised all defendants that Golub demanded $941,000.00 
in judgment against all defendants but then ague (on page 37 of the same brief) that Golub's 
double recovery is allowed because no discrete contract claim exists that put the defendants on 
3 Golub's 2007 Complaint then goes on to allege "SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF DUTY OF 
GOOD FAITH", a contract claim, and "THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACT." (R, Vol. 1, p. 167) 
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notice of a specific amount prayed for. Compare Resp. Br. at 15-16 with Resp. Br. at 37. 
Golub's March 11, 2009 judgment by default differed in kind from and exceed the amount 
prayed for in the 2007 Complaint's demand for judgment. The trial court erred in finding 
otherwise and should be reversed. 
Golub's reliance on Schlieffv. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353, 15 P.2d 726, 729 (1932) does not 
necessitate a different result. Schlieffholds "the court may grant ... any relief consistent with the 
case made by the complaint embraced within the issues. It Id Golub cites his discovery responses 
for the proposition that Kirk-Hughes should have known that Golub was seeking $941,000 
against all defendants in the 2007 Action. (Resp. Br. pg. 17) But Golub's discovery responses, 
like Golub's complaint, imply that Peterson (not the other 2007 Action defendants) was at fault 
for "the principal amount of the [unspecified] commission." Id 
The default judgment should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4). 
D. The trial court erred in absolving Golub from establishing IC 55-606's "good 
faith" element, issues of fact exist as to whether Golub was a good faith 
encumbrancer. and issues of fact exist as to whether the default judgment was 
supported by valuable consideration. 
Golub argues that a judgment lien holder does not have to establish IC 55-606's "good 
faith" element. Golub is \\Tong and the trial court erred in failing to hold Golub to establishing 
"good faith." The IC 55-606 provides, in full: 
55-606. Conclusiveness of conveyance Bona fide 
purchasers. Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property 
is conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone 
subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or 
encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 15 
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that 
is first duly recorded. (emphasis added) 
An encumbrancer is "one having a legal claim, such as a lien or mortgage. f1 Blacks Law 
Dictionary, at 432 (7th Ed. 2000). Golub concedes that "the effect of Golub's judgment...creates 
a lien on the real property of a debtor as a matter of law." (Resp. Br. at pg. 12) Golub is an 
encumbrancer because he had a lien (i.e. the March 11, 2009 default jUdgment) and filed suit 
against Kirk-Scott, and others, in 2013 to foreclose upon that lien. Encumbrancers may "in good 
faith and for valuable consideration acquire[] title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment 
lien." IC 55-606. This Court holds "that one cannot be a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer 
when a reasonable investigation of the property would have revealed the existence of the 
conflicting claim in question." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 221, 526 P .2d 178, 181 
(1974)(emphasis added). Golub is an encumbrancer who must establish the "good faith" 
element. And such a conclusion is consistent with Idaho law which states that default judgments 
are disfavored; for it would be illogical for the Idaho legislature to require encumbrancers with 
liens that are not default judgments to establish "good faith" but not require encumbrancers with 
default judgments (which are disfavored) to abide by the same "good faith" standard. 
Numerous material issues of fact exist as to whether Golub was a "good faith" 
encumbrancer and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Golub's behalf. Those 
issues of fact include, but are not limited to, Darlene Moore infonning Golub in 2006 of the 
Kirk-Scott Deed of Trust and Golub's own testimony that Golub knew that Kirk-Scott had "clear 
title" to the Atkinson and Sloan property as of 2004. (Kirk-Scott Br. pg. 11-12) Golub's self 
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serving affidavit (R. Vol. 1, p. 96) is not enough to survive (much less affirmatively obtain) 
summary judgment. See Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 859 
(9th Cir. 2009). (Kirk-Scott Bf. at 28-30) Further, in granting summary judgment for Golub the 
trial court ignored the rule that "[a]ll disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be 
drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159 P.3d 862, 
864 (2007). Although confronted with evidence of Golub's contradictory and self-serving 
testimony, the trial court construed the disputed facts in favor of Golub and then sanctioned 
Kirk-Scott when Kirk-Scott readdressed Golub's lack of credibility on reconsideration. 
Additionally, the fact that the Kootenai County Recorder's office recorded Kirk-Scott's Deed of 
Trust4 and Golub was not confused by the instrument militate against the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
4 Golub cites the 1968 case of Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 215, 440 P.2d 
143, 148 (1968) for the proposition that a recorded instrument does not impart constructive 
notice when (i) there was no personal appearance before a notary (ii) it is admitted by the party 
seeking to uphold the validity of the acknowledgment that it was not taken personally before a 
notary, or (iii) where it is shown that the notary has a beneficial or financial interest. (Resp. Br. at 
34) Here the Kirk-Scott Deed of Trust was signed by Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC on 
November 18, 2004, before Sherry Patterson, aN otary Public in the State of Nevada. (R, Vo 1. 1, 
p. 40) None of the Sleight deficiencies exist here and the instrument's recording imparts 
constructive notice on Golub. Further Kirk-Scott's reliance on Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 
761,572 P.2d 861,864 (1977)(instrument not signed by sellers imparted constructive notice and 
holding "[i]f entitled to recordation, it was constructive notice as to its contents"), controls 
because Matheson was decided in 1977 - - - nine years after Sleight was decided. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 17 
Additional issues of fact exist as to whether the default judgment was supported by 
valuable consideration. For iViountain Home Lumber Co., Ltd v. Swartout, 30 Idaho 559, 166 P. 
271 (1917) and Rexburg Lumber Co. v. Purrington, 62 Idaho 461, 113 P.2d 511,513-514 (1941), 
make clear that a judgment merely credited on the purchase price is not supported by valuable 
consideration. Golub admits to crediting the default judgment against the real property's price. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 524) Golub argues Swartout does not apply because it did not address the validity 
or priority of the lien at issue. (Resp. Br. at 23) Kirk-Scott did not cite Swartout for that 
proposition: it cited Swartout for the proposition that a credit bid is not valuable consideration - -
- precisely the case here. 
E. The trial court improperly relied on In re Schwartz in detennining that Kirk-
Scott's Deed of Trust was void and improperly allowed Golub double recovery. 
Kirk-Scott argued that the trial court erred in applying In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569 (9th 
Cir. 1992) by not addressing the standing requirements set out in In re Brooks, 79 B.R. 479, 481 
(Bankr. 9th Cir.1987) ajJ'd, 871 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.1989). Golub argues that Golub did not need to 
challenge Kirk-Scott's post bankruptcy petition recording of the Deed of Trust because the 
recording was void as a matter of law. Golub misreads Kirk-Scott's argument. The trial court 
relied on Schwartz for the proposition that the Deed of Trust was void. But in order for Schwartz 
to apply the entity seeking to void the recordation must have standing as set out under Brooks. 
And Brooks held that a post-petition re-recording of deed of trust could not be avoided since "the 
debtor or the trustee chose not to invoke the protections of 11 US.C. § 362, no other party 
[could] attack any acts in violation of the automatic stay". In re Schwartz, favorably cites Brooks 
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and Brooks' standing requirement. 871 F.2d at 90. Schwartz did not overrule, question, or 
dispose of Brooks. Brooks' standing requirement controls and the trial court erred not 
considering whether Golub had standing under Brooks. 
Kirk-Scott moved to compel Golub to disclose the amount of settlement money it 
received from the Peterson defendants, the trial court mooted Kirk-Scott's motion, and 
sanctioned Kirk-Scott when Kirk-Scott addressed that issue on reconsideration. The trial court's 
sanctioning of the Golub's double recovery contravenes Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 
Idaho 16, 31 (2005), which holds "there can only be one award of damages for a single injury" 
and "the trial court may reduce the judgment to a single recovery, if it believes the jury awarded 
a party twice for the same injury." 
Golub tries to distinguish Gunter, which (like the 2007 Action) involved breach of 
contract and tortious interference claims, by claiming that "this is [not] a contract case." (Resp. 
Br. p. 36-37) Golub's argument is not supported by the record or the law. The record reflects that 
Golub brought contract and tort claims as part of its 2007 Action. (R, Vol. 1, p. 166-168) 
Accordingly Gunter applies and the trial court erred in not allowing Kirk-Scott to determine the 
amount of recovery by which Golub's default judgment should be reduced. 
F. Kirk -Scott should not have been sanctioned for asking the trial court to reduce the 
judgment, address Golubs' double recovery, and address Golub's credibility 
regarding the IC 55-606 "good faith" issue. 
Golub correctly points out that Kirk-Scott brought its "Motion to Amend the Judgment" 
under IRCP 59(a)(1), (6) & (7). (Resp. Br. at 37) Under those standards Kirk-Scott sought to 
inform the trial court of legal and factual errors that occurred in the proceedings by addressing, 
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inter alia, Golub's sworn testimony that Golub was entitled to, at best, $464,000 of the $941,000, 
Golub's double recovery, and Golub's credibility as it related to the IC 55-606 "good faith" issue. 
(Kirk-Scott Br. pg 40) Kirk-Scott's motion was proper under Rule 59 and the trial court abused 
its discretion by sanctioning Kirk-Scott for bringing the motion. 
Golub then argues that Kirk-Scott's motion was a veiled Rule 11(a)(2)(B) motion insofar 
as it sought to review the trial court's denial of Kirk-Scott's Rule 60 motions. (Resp. Br. pg. 38) 
That argument fails for two reasons. First, Kirk-Scott withdrew the Rule 60(b)(4) component of 
its reconsideration motion. (Kirk-Scott Br. pg. 40) Second, the trial court undisputedly did not 
address Kirk-Scott's Rule 60(b )(5) and Rule 60(b )(6) motions in its August 9th or August 19th 
orders. One cannot violate IRCP 11(a)(2)(B) by asking the trial cOUli to reconsider a Rule 60 
motion that the trial court did not decide in the first place. The trial court erred in sanctioning 
Kirk-Scott for seeking reconsideration of the Rule 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) motions the trial court 
never decided. 
Sanctions are a court management tool and are to be used narrowly. Landvik by Landvik 
v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 61 (Ct. App. 1997). The trial court abused its discretion by not 
following that rule. The trial court not only ignored Landvick but sua sponte issued its sanctions 
motion against Kirk-Scott while ignoring the undisputed fact (addressed at the summary 
judgment and reconsideration stages) that Golub, by Golub's own words, was not entitled to at 
least half of the $941,000. 
Should this Court reverse the trial court Kirk-Scott respectfully requests remand to a new 
trial judge. Kirk-Scott reserves the right to bring that motion should it become necessary. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be reversed, Kirk-Scott's Motion to Vacate should be granted, 
Golubs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, and the trial court's sua sponte 
sanctions order against Kirk-Scott should be vacated. 
Dated: April 30,2014. 
By: ___ -""'-_---'''--__ -----' ~ __ _ 
Attorney for Kirk-Scott, Ltd. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~k 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of~~ __ 2014, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Michael T. Howard 
Winston & Cashett 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Michael T. Bissell 
Campbell & Bissell, PLLC 
820 \\T. 7th 
Spokane, W A 99204 
Attorneys for Appellants Kirk-Hughes 















T elecopy (FAX) 
MATTHEW Z. CROTTY 
